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Recent Case

MENTAL HEALTH -

RESTRAINT OR TREATMENT IN INSTITUTIONS

RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT BASED ON RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Plaintiff had a long history of psychiatric problems which had
precipitated several previous admissions to the state psychiatric
hospital. 1 On August 10, 1976, plaintiff was involuntarily
committed to that hospital. 2 This action was brought to enjoin the
staff of the hospital from forcibly administering drugs to the
plaintiff in a non-emergency without his consent. 3 The plaintiff's
1. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Stipp. 1131,1135 (D.NJ. 1978).
2. Id. at 1136 (D.N.J. 1978). Plaintiff was involuntarily committed on August 10, 1976,
prsuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27 (West 1964). The plaintiff was committed to Ancora
Psychiatric Hospital, a state-operated hospital for the mentally ill. The plaintiff had been admitted
there on eleven occasions prior to his most recent admission. His first admission occurred in April,
1973. The plaintiff tsually had entered the hospital on a vohntary basis. He was diagnosed at
varios times as paranoid schizophrenic, and manic-depressive. Id. at 1135-36.
Paranoid schizophrenia is defined as follows:
The paranoid type is characterized by self-centered, unrealistic thinking. There are
delusions of persecution and/or grandeur, ideas of reference (an exaggerated
impression that the actions of others, stch as smiling or conversing, have reference to
oneself), and hallucinations. There may be tnfounded suispicotsness, hostility, and an
aggressive attitude.
3 SCHMIDT's ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE S-30 (1978).
Manic-depressive illness is defined as follows:
A mental illness which is one of a group marked by severe swings in mood ranging
from abnormal elation to profotnd depression. Other characteristics are delusions,
illusions, and hallucinations. There is a tendency for remissions (a temporary rettrn to
normal) and recturrences. The manic type (in which mania predominates) is marked
by elation, excessive talkativeness, irritability and physical activity. In the depressive
type, there is predominace of depression as well as mental and physical lethargy. In
the mixed type of manic-depressive psychosis, there is a mixture of both manic and
depressive symptoms.
Id. at M-18.
3. 462 F. Sipp. at 1134. The injunction was sotght pursuant to rule 65(a) of the FEOERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE which states as follows:
(a) PreliminaryInjunction
(1) Notice. No preliminary injtnction shall be issued without notice to the adverse
party.
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complaints about the drugs concerned the side effects he was
experiencing. 4 The plaintiff alleged violations of several rights. 5 A
preliminary injunction was granted only on the issue of the right to
refuse medication. 6 The United States District Court of NewJersey
(2) Consolidation of Hearingwith Trialon Merits. Before or after the commencement of the
hearing of an application for a preliminary inunction, the court may order the trial of
the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the
application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon
an application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible upon the trial
on the merits becomes part of the record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the
trial. This subdivision (a) (2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to the parties
any rights they may have to trial byijury.
FEi. R. Civ. P. 65 (a).
Plaintiff was maintained on several different drugs during his various stays at the hospital, but
the drugs he primarily obiected to were lithium carbonate and prolixin decanoate. 462 F. Stipp. at
1139 n.4, 1140-41.
Prolixin decanoate is described as a highly potent behavior modifier of the psychotropic
(phenothiazine) group of medications. In this particular form, the drug is especially long acting and
is tsed primarily to control manifestations of schizophrenia. PHYSICIAN'S DEsK REFERENCE 1667
(33rded. 1979).
Lithium carbonate is described as indicated in the treatment of the manic-depressive illness.
The medication will help alleviate the typical mania symptoms of excessive speech, motor
hyperactivity, reduced need for sleep, flight of ideas, grandiosity, elation, poor jtldgment and
aggressiveness. The exact biochemical action of lithium carbonate in the body is unknown. Id. at
1497.
4. 462 F. Supp. at 1137-38. All psychotropic 'drugs, including prolixin decanoate, cause
problems in central nervous system functioning with prolonged use. One side effect common to the
central nervous system is akinesia. Akinesia refers to a state of diminished spontaneity, and feelings
of weakness and muscle fatigue. Id. at 1138, citing Zander, Prolixin Decanoate."A Review of the Research,
2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 37 (1977).
Another central nervous system side effect is tardive dyskinesia. "Tardive dyskinesia is
characterized by rhythmical, repetitive, involuntary movements of the tongue, face, mouth or iaw,
sometimes accompanied by other bizarre muscular activity." 462 F. Stipp. at 1138, citing Zander, 2
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 37 (1977).
Lithium carbonate has several potential side effects incluiding the creation of potentially serious
thyroid, heart and brain abnormal reactions. PHYSICIAN'S DEsK REFERENCE 1498 (33rd ed. 1979).
The plaintiff suffered from several minor physical symptoms associated with the drugs and had
the beginning symptoms of tardive dyskinesia from his use of prolixin decanoate. 462 F. Suipp. at
1140-41, 1144. The plaintiff had also complained of the lithium carbonate causing him to be depressed in the past. Id.at 1139 n.4.
5. Id. at 1134. Plaintiff had a six count complaint, but the court interpreted the complaint as
charging the defendants with violations of four rights, "(1) the right to refuse medication in
nunemergent circumstances, (2) the right to treatment, (3) the right of access to counsel, and (4) the
right to be free from physical abuse while in custody." Id.
6. Id. Plaintiff's complaint was grotnded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with federal jurisdiction
applicable tnder 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974) provides as follows:
Every person who. under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or itsage, of any State or Territory, stbjects, or causes to be siubiected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the Jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party iniured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides as follows:
The district couirts shall have original uirisdiction ofany civil
action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person:
(1) to recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the
deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done
in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42:
(2) to recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or aid in preventing
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recognized the state's strong interests in maintaining the plaintiff
on the prescribed therapeutic regime, 7 but held an involuntarily
committed mental patient may have the right to refuse nonemergency medications based on a constitutional right of privacy. 8
In addition, a due process hearing is required prior to the forced
administration of drugs in- non-emergency situations. 9 Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
The common law recognized a right of privacy in a different
sense than is recognized constitutionally in the United States. 10 The
common law recognized the torts of assault and battery as invasions
of the right of privacy for which the injured individual could seek
legal redress."i The individual could consent to the touching of his
person, but this consent could be limited.' 2 The courts began to
recognize the rights of the mentally ill individual to protect himself
against unwanted medical invasions of his body early in this
century.' 3 The common law has continued to recognize this right
4
up to the present day.'
The United States Constitution does not specifically identify a
any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were aboou
to occur and power to prevent;
(3) to redress the deprivation, inder color of any Stat( law, statt, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or imminity secuired by the
Constitution of the United States or hy any Act ofCongress providing fbr equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within thepirisdiction of the United Slates;
(4) to recover damages or to secre eq i table or other reliefinder amy A(I of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights inolding the right toVote.
Id.
7. 462 F. Supp. at 1145-47. The co,rt realized that the right to rcfose treatment (oild not lte
absolhte. The co rt also recognized three specific state interests which
st be considered in its
ot
decision. The coot recognized the state's interest in confining those mentally ill indivithals
dangerous in society. The court also recognized the doctrine of parens patriae. Finally, the state
has an interest in providing for the least restrictive treatment alternatives for its mentally ill citizens.
Id.at 1145-46.
8. 462 F. Supp. at 1144. The right of privacy regarding choice of inedical tare was first alluded
to in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right was given more exact constittional
stat-is in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See infta notes 15-23.
9. 462 F. Sopp. at 1147. See infra notes 40-43.
10. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). Botsford recognized the common law
right to bodily privacy. The Coort stated that "non right is held more sacred, or is more areF, 'llv
goarded by the common law, then the right of every individuial to the possession and control of hi'
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, onless by clear and on(testionall

authority of law." Id.at 251.
11. Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902); O'Brien v. C,mard S. S. Co., 154 Mass.
272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891); Mailand v. Mailand, 83 Minn. 453, 86 N.W. 445 (1901). SeeW. PROsSER,
LA'"oF I ORTS 5 §9, 10, 18 (4th cr.1971).
12. Id. § 18at 103-05.
13. Pratt v. Davis, 224 II1. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (A mentally ill-woman sed her physician
for operating on her withoutt her consent and was allowed to recover damages). See also, Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) in which the cotrt stated,
"[elvery htman being or adilt years and so,,nd mind has a right to determine what shall be donte
with his own body .. " Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
14. In re Pescinski, 67 Wis.2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975). In this case the Supreme Cotrt of
Wisconsin woold not allow a coonty court to order a kidney transfer operation on a mentally
incompetent ward withoit a showing of benefit to the ward or withoot informed consent given by the
ward or his guardian ad litem. The cort made this rling in spite of the fact that the ward's sister
was in dire need of a kidney donor. Id.
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right to refuse treatment, but the Supreme Court of the United
States has long recognized the right of the individual to control his
own body. 5 The Court, however, did not begin to formulate a
concept of a right of privacy until 1928.16 The privacy right did not
obtain solid constitutional status until the Court's ruling in Griswold
v. Connecticut. 17 The Court continued to develop the constitutional
right to privacy in subsequent holdings dealing with the control of
one's person. 18 In Roe v. Wade19 the Court recognized the
individual's right to private bodily self-determination in most
instances. 20 The Court has also held that the individual has a right
of freedom from governmental interference with his mind. 2' The
general right of bodily privacy has continued to be protected since
22
Roe v. Wade.
In spite of the general recognition of a right of privacy, the
Supreme Court has not directly considered the constitutionality of
a committed mental patient's right to refuse medical treatment.
The Court has only considered the mental patient's rights on a
piecemeal basis. 23 State and federal courts, however, have directly
15. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The United States Stipreme Couirt made clear
that "[c]onstitutional provisions for the secrity of person and property should be liberally
constr,ted." Id. at 617.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The dissenting opinion spoke ofa general
ight to be left alone as one of the most fundamental rights in human society. Id. at 478 (Brandies, .J.,
dissenting).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This case emmiciated the penumbra theory, that there is a general
right of privacy protected by the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, and by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965). In 1966, however, the Court upheld unconsented blood drawing on
individujals involved in driving while intoxicated cases. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
In 1961, considering a search and seizure case, the Court made reference to a right of privacy
based on the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court cited several of its
prior holdings concerning privacy in the search and seizuire area. Id. at 647-57. For a discuission of
right to privacy prior to Griswold, see Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court,
1962 S. CT. REv. 212.
18. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (declaring a Georgia statute unduly restrictive on a
woman's right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a
Massachusetts statute which denied unmarried persons access to contraceptives); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the first amendment as made applicable to the states by
the fouirteenth amendment prohibits making private possession of obscene material a crime).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). "The Couirt's decisions recognizing a right of
privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate...
A State may properly assert important interests in safegLuarding health, in maintaining medical
standards and in protecting potential life." Id.at 153-54.
21. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (the Couirt
held that a Missouri abortion statute which required either spotsal or parental consent for an
abortion was tnconstitutional).
23. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975) (indicating a state may not
constitutionally confine a non-dangerouis mental patient against his will); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (invalidating an Indiana statute indefinitely confining a criminal defendatnt
solely on his lack of capacity to stand trial); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring that a minor be
given access to legal counsel prior to commitment to a state institution); Baxstrom v. Harold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966) (invalidating a New York statute allowing for civil commitment of a mentally ill
individual immediately after the expiration of his prison term without benefit of a .iry review of his
situation).
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considered the constitutional aspects of the right of privacy and the
right to refuse treatment as applied to mental health patients,2 4 but
25
present day law in this area varies greatly among jurisdictions.
The doctrine of parens patriae,26 for example, has resulted in the
reluctance of several jurisdictions to allow the mentally ill patient
treatment ordered by the
the right to refuse medical or psychiatric
27
situation.
non-emergency
state in a
In Rennie v. Klein, the court noted it was adjudicating a federal
constitutional claim involving the right of a committed mental
health patient to refuse non-emergency medication.

28

The Rennie

court recognized the possibility of the right claimed by the plaintiff
as existing in several areas of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. 29 The Rennie court felt that the constitutional right of

privacy and the individual's right to due process contained the
strongest justifications in favor of a ruling for the plaintiff.30 The
court relied on several cases in support of the contention that the
right of privacy included the right to protect mental processes from
31
state interference in non-emergency circumstances.
24. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich. Jutly 10, 1973), summary at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973). Kaimowitz involved a
situiation in which a mentally ill individual refused, through court intervention, to participate in an
experimental psychosurgery program. The case primarily concerns the issue of informed consent.
The court based its ruling on the constitutional right of privacy as developed by the United States
Stpreme Court. The cotrt conchded that the right of privacy extends to the protection of the
individtal's thoughts. Id. at 2064. For a comprehensive treatment of Kaimowitz, see Note, Kaimowitz
v. Department of Mental Health: A Right to be Freefrom Experimental Psychosurgery? 54 B.U.L. REV. 301
(1974).
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), considered an
involtntarily committed mental health patient's right to refusal of a purely physical medical
diagnostic procedure. Id.
Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) invalidated as
unconstituitional a Michigan statute allowing for inconsented bodily intrusions of mental health
patients. The court based its decision on right of privacy and due process grounds. Id. at 1100.
25. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 135-B:15 (1977). This statute indicates that voluntary patients
may refuse any treatment, but a similar provision is not made for the involuntarily committed
patient. Miss. CooE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1973) allows substituted consent to treatment for a person of
unsound mind. There is no indication that the person has to be adijudicated incompetent prior to
obtaining the substituted consent. See also Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patient'sRight to
Refuse Treatment, 72 N.W.U.L. REv. 461 (1977).
26. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971). "Parens patriae
literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and gtardian
of persons under legal disability." Id. at 1089.
27. Id. See also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
28. 462 F. Stipp. at 1142.
29. Id.at 1142-48. The court noted the United States Supreme Court's position upholding the
individuial's autonomy over his body, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Id. at 1144. The court
also considered and rejected the possibility of crtel and unusutal punishment claims based on the
eighth amendment. Id. at 1143.
30. Id. at 1144-45, 1147-48.
31. Id. at 1144, citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (indicating that the state has
no right to control men's minds by dictating what they may or may not read or watch in the privacy
of their homes); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971) (allowing a tort action and
recovery for a mentally ill patient who received medical treatment against her ",;ill); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976) (indicating that the state had to have a compelling interest
in keeping a comatose girl on life support systems against her parents' wishes); Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434 AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10,
1973), stummary at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (july 31, 1973) (indicating that a mentally ill patient may not
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The Rennie court described its decision as a practical one
because expert testimony revealed that psychiatric treatment of a
mentally ill patient without his cooperation was less effective than
the same treatment accepted voluntarily. 32 The court further noted
that the patient is the only one who can know the negative effects he
receives from a particular drug. 33 The divergence of opinion among
physicians concerning the proper treatment required for a given
34
mentally ill patient was also recognized.
In arriving at the holding regarding the right to privacy, the
Rennie court discussed three interests the state has in requiring that
mental health patients receive certain medical and psychiatric
care. 35 First, the court recognized the state's interest in confining a
mentally ill individual who is "dangerous in a free society." 36 The
court felt such a right did not give the state the power to medically
treat the patient involuntarily because "once confined, the patient
cannot hurt those outside." 31 Second, the court recognized the
doctrine of parenspatriaeas giving the state certain responsibilities in
the case of mental health patients who have been declared mentally
incompetent. 38 The Rennie court, however, felt a hearing on mental
competence should be held before the state could be justified in
using the parens patriaedoctrine as a basis for medicating a mentally
ill patient against his wishes in a non-emergency situation. 39 Third,
the court felt the concept of the least restrictive treatment
alternatives should be considered in any medical treatment
decisions the state makes regarding involuntarily committed
patients.40
be allowed to participate in an experimental psychosurgery program without giving an informed
consent).
Of particular note is the Winters case. In this case, the federal court stated that it cannot be
presumed an individual is not competent to handle his own affairs because he has been committed to
a mental institution. 446 F.2d at 68.
32. 462 F. Stpp. at 1144.
33. Id. at 1145. See supra note 4. The court feared the plaintiff would deteriorate firther by
continingon the drugs he did not wish to take. 462 F. Stipp. at 1146-47.
34. Id. See also supra note 2.
35. 462 F. Stipp. at 1145-47.
36. Id. at 1145.
37. Id. The court realized a patient's desire to refuse medication or other psychiatric treatment
must be overridden by the state's interest in protecting other mental patients or state employees from
any danger a patient might present without such treatment. Id.
38. Id. See supra note 26.
39. 462 F. Supp. at 1146. The plaintiff had never been adjidicated incompetent and was lucid
at times. Id.
40. Id. The court noted prior decisions justifying the concept of least restrictive alternatives as
applied to choice of custodial settings and felt the concept should be extended to choice of
medications in order to protect the patient's due process rights. Id. at 1146, citing Eubanks v.
Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (requiring that committed mentally ill patients who
have committed no crime be given access to the least restrictive treatment alternative); Welsh v.
Tikins, 373 F. Stpp. 487, 501 (D. Minn. 1974) (indicating that state authorities must seek the least
restricitve alternative treatment for committed mentally ill patients under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment). One of the psychiatrists indicated a trial treatment of lithium and an
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The court also detailed several duties the state must comply
with in order to fulfill constitutional due process requirements. 4 1
The patient must be allowed to participate in the planning of his
treatment program, 42 the patient must be given access to legal
counsel, 43 and the patient is entitled to an evaluation and
subsequent testimony at a due process hearing by a psychiatrist
independent from the state institutional setting. 4 4 The state must
also provide the patient's attorney and the outside psychiatrist with
access to the patient's records so a fair evaluation of his situation
may be made. 45 Finally, the state must provide funds for an
attorney and an independent psychiatrist if the patient cannot
46
afford them.
In arriving at its decision, the court noted that the New Jersey
Superior Court 47 had recently held that an involuntarily committed
mental patient could not refuse non-emergency medication. 48 The
New Jersey court interpreted a state statute4 9 which allowed
antidepressant might be a less restrictive alternative than the drag regime the plaintiff had been on.
The cort agreed to the offered treatment. 462 F. Stipp. at 1146.
41. Id.at 1147-48. In the discussion of due process the court also noted shortcomings in New
Jersey's Bdletin 78-3 regarding the administration of psychotropic medication. The bulletin did not
provide for a die process hearing prior to the forced administration of medication. The blletin also
failed to provide for an evaluation of patients by an independent psychiatrist. Finally, the bulletin
did not provide for access to the patient's records by his lawyer and the independent psychiatrist so
they might make an appropriate assessment of the patient. Id.
In September, 1979, the court described the procedural due process requirements which must
be met prior to the administration of psychotropic drugs in all but emergency situations. The cotrt
made this riling as a result of further relief reqttested by the plaintiff. The patient must be advised of
his right to refuse the medication, and the administering agency must obtain the patient's written
permission to administer the drugs on forms explaining this constitutional right to the patient.
The consent forms also must detail the state's responsibility to provide qualified patient
advocates (attorneys, psychologists, social workers, registered nurses or paralegals under the
supervision of an attorney or psychiatrist in the state mental health department) for those patients
who refiuse offered medication, or those patients who request such an advocate. Rennie v. Klein,
(D.N.J.), suimmary at 48 U.S.L.W. 2211 (Sept. 25, 1979).
42. Id. at 1147, citing In Re W. S.Jr., 152 N.J. Super. 298, 377 A.2d 969 (1977). In the W. S.
Jr. case, the New Jersey Superior Court indicated that mentally ill patients have the right to be
informed of and to participate in any treatment programs they are suibjected to. Id. at 300, 377 A.2d
at 971. The NewJersey Superior Court is a coutrt of original general. urisdiction throtghoutt the state
of New Jersey. It has an appellate division, a law division, and a chatincery division. The appellate
division serves as an intermediate step between the New Jersey county courts and the New Jersey
Sutpreme Couirt.
43. 462 F. Stipp. at 1147, citing In re Gauilt, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). The Gault case held that an
individial muist be advised of his right to legal counsel if there is a possibility that his freedom will be
curtailed. A parent, a guardian, or the court cannot be expected to adequtately protect his rights. Id.
at 34-41.
44. 462 F. Stipp. at 1147-48.
45. Id.at 1148.
46. Id.
47. 462 F. Stipp. at 1141, citing In re Hospitalization of B, 156 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d
760 (1977). In this case the court held an involuntarily committed mental patient in New Jersey did
not have a statutory right to refuse medication. Id. at 234, 383 A.2d at 763.
48. Id.
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(d) (1 ) (Suipp. 1979). The statute provides as follows:
No medication shall be administered mless at the
Notation of each patient's medication shall be kept in
weekly, the attending physician shall review the drug
his care. All physicians' orders or prescriptions shall

written order of a physician.
his treatment records. At least
regimen of each patient under
be written with a termination
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voluntary patients to refuse medication as implying that
involuntarily committed mental patients could not refuse offered
medication50
The North Dakota Legislature recently revised North
Dakota's statutory scheme for involuntary commitment and
treatment of mentally ill patients. 51 This corrected many of the
constitutional problems inherent in the statutes concerning mental
health commitments. 2 There were further changes made in the last
legislative session. 53 The latest changes appear to bring North
Dakota law in very close parallel with the federal district court's
ruling in Rennie.
The latest revisions provide for medical treatment of an
involuntarily committed patient over his objections only in the
event that "these treatments are necessary to prevent bodily harm
to the patient or others or to prevent imminent deterioration of the
respondent's physical or mental conditions.' ,54 The current statutes
also provide for an independent expert examination 55 paid for by
date, which shall not exceed 30 days. Medication shall not be used as punishment, for
the convenience of staff, as a substitute for a treatment program, or in quantities that
interfere with the patient's treatment program. Voluntarily committed patients shall
have the right to refuse medication.
Id.
50. 156 N.J. Sper. at 235, 383 A.2d at 764. In the situation involving the plaintiffin the Rennie
case, the couirt woutld not isste an injunction against the hospital administering certain drugs to the
plaintiff because the medication he obiected to had been discontinued. The Rennie court stated that
due process hearings would be scheduled to examine any further refisal of the plaintiff to take
prescribed non-emergency medications. Before issuing any fiture iniunction requested by the
plaintiff' the court made clear it would examine the following points in a hearing regarding the
plaintiff's refusal to take non-emergency medications, "(1) plaintiff's physical threat to patients and
staff at the institution. (2) plaintiff's capacity to decide on his particular treatment, (3) whether any
less restrictive treatments exist, and (4) the risk of permanent side effects from the proposed
treatment." 462 F. Stipp: at 1148.
The plaintiff' did ask for another injunction to stop medication he did not wish to take. The
plaintiff's psychiatric condition had worsened. The court examined the four points it had described
earlier and denied the intinction. The hospital staff was allowed to continue the administration of
antipsychotic medication to the plaintiff against his wishes. Id. at 1151-54.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 25-03.1 (1977). For a discussion of the constitutional problems
inherent in North Dakota's commitment laws prior to the 1977 revisions, see Lockney, Constitutional
Problems with Civil Commitment of the.Mentally Illin North Dakota, 52 N.D.L. REv. 83 (1975). The North
Dakota Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to rule on the constittionality of North
Dakota's commitment laws prior to the changes. The Federal District Court of North Dakota had a
case before it in which the petitioner asked that North Dakota's laws in this area be declared
utconstitutional but the case was dismissed due to petitioner's lack of standing. Poe v. Smith, Ci.
No. A2-74-84 (D.N.D.memo in order for motion to dismiss granted Dec. 30, 1974).
52. See N.D. CENT. COnE ch. 25-03 (1970). Seealso Lockney, Constitutional Problems with Civil
Commitment oftheblentally Ill in North Dakota, 52 N.D.L. REV. 83.
53. N.D. CENT. CoDE ch. 25-03.1 (Suipp. 1979).
54. N.D. CENT. COoE 5 25-03.1-24 (Stupp. 1979). Seealso section 12-05-05(4) of the North
Dakota Century Code which refers to the physician's right to use force to administer medication.
N.D. CENT. CODE q 12-05-05(4) (1977).
55. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 25-03.1-31 (Stipp. 1979). Section 25-03.1-02(7) of the North Dakota
Centtr' Code states that. " 'independent expert examiner' means a licensed physician, psychiatrist.
or clinical psychologist chosen at the request of the respondent to provide an independent evalutation
of whether the respondent meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment. " N.D. CENT. COnE §
25-03.1-02(7) (Stipp. 1979). Section 25-03.1-09(2) points out that the respondent will be given the
3
opportunity to select the examiner. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 25-0 .1-09(2) (Stipp. 1979).
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56
the patient's home county, and due process hearings.
Two potential problems seem to continue to exist in spite of
the legislature's efforts at revision. The first concerns the statuite's
definition of those patients requiring treatment. 57 The stattite
distinguishes the seriously mentally ill patient from the patient who
is dangerous to himself or others. A person who is not dangerouis
and yet is still liable for involuntary commitment in an inpatient
treatment facility would not be58 getting the benefit of the least
restrictive treatment alternative.
Another potential problem concerns the commitment hearing
and its relationship to the giving of non-emergency medication to
the involuntarily committed patient against his wishes. The Rennie
court required a due process type hearing prior to any emergency
such administration of drugs. 59 The North Dakota Century Code
60
provides for due process hearings prior to commitment, and for
61 The North
review of the patient's status while he is in treatment.
Dakota Century Code, however, does not provide for any due
process hearings prior to administration of medication or other
treatment of a patient against his wishes in a non-emergency

situation.62
56. N.D. CENT. CooE 25-03.1-09 (Sipp. 1979).
57. N.D. CENT. CooE . 25-03.1-02(11 )(a) & (b)(Sipp. 1979). These sections provide as follows:
"Person requiring treatment" means either a person:
(a) who is severly mentally ill; or
(b) who is mentally ill, an alcoholic or drog addic and lthere is a rcasonalfi
expectation that if the person is not hospitalized there exists a scrio,s risk of harii to
himself, others or property. 'Serious risks of harm" means a s,ibstinial likelitod of(1) S,,icide as manifested by s,,ical threats, atempts, or signifiant
depression relevant to the saiiidal potential; or
ting
(2) Killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on another person, infli
significant property damage, as manifested by acts or ihreats; or
(3) sibstantial deterioration in physical hialhh, or sOistantial ini',ry,
disease or death resilting from poor self-control or dgicnt in providing nc's
shelter, nutrition, or personal care.
Id.
58. See supra note 40. Representative Wayne Stene;hea of' Grand Forks was di Ho,ise of
Representatives sponsor of the bill (Senate Bill No. 2411) providing for the 1979 changes in North
Dakota Century Code chapter 25-03. 1. Mr. Stenehem recommended that section 25-03.1 -02(1 1)(a)
it was imonstittional.
of the North Dakota Centry Code be diited from the bill bea,,se he feft
The section was retained over his obections. Telephone iall from Ronald E. Goodman to Wayne
Steneihem (April 12, 1979).
59. 462 F. Sipp. at 1147. Seesupra note 41.
60. N.D. CENT. COnE § 25-03.1-09, 10, 11, 12,-13 (Stipp. 1979).
61. N.D. CENT. COOE § 25-03.1-31 (Stipp. 1979).
62. See N.D. CENT. CooE § 25-03.1-40(10) (Stpp. 1977). Section 25-03.1-40 of' the North
in general.
Dakota Centiry Code sets o,,tthe rights of mentally ill patienis in treatment faciliiies
N.D. CENT. CooE § 25-03.1-40. The section is stbicci, however, to the limitations aitthorized by
section 25-03.1-41 of the North Dakota Centitry Code which reads as follows:
The rights enumerated in section 25-03.1-40 may be limited or restricted by the
treating physician or psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, if in his medical judgment to
do so woild be in the best interests ofthe patient and the rights are restrited or limited
in the manner aithorized by the rules and regudations promilgated p,,rsmnm to

NORTH DAKOTA LAv REVIEW

The Rennie decision appears to be in line with the general
direction of the United States Supreme Court in the area of the
right to privacy. 63 North Dakota's present law also appears
compatible with the United States Supreme Court and the Rennie
ruling, except for the problem with the person who is not dangerous
and yet is still subject to involuntary commitment and the question
regarding due process hearings for forced non-emergency
64
medication and treatment.
A problem with the Rennie ruling is the limits it seems to place
on professionals in a mental health setting. The requirement of a
due process hearing prior to forced administration of unwanted
medication places a burden on the courts. The due process hearing
requirement may, in some cases, protect the patient's
constitutional rights by delaying treatment which may be of benefit
to the patient.

RON GOODMAN

section 25-03.1-46. Whenever a physician, psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
responsible for the treatment ofa particular patient imposes a special restriction on the
rights of patient as authorized by the rules and regulations, a written order specifying
the restrictions and the reasons therefor shall be signed by the physician, psychiatrist,
or clinical psychologist and attached to the patient's chart. These restrictions shall be
reviewed at intervals of not more than fourteen days and may be renewed by following
the procedure set out in this section.
N.D. CENT. CoF § 25-03.1-41 (Supp. 1979).
Section 25-03.1-41 thus limits the rights given the patient in section 25-03.1-40 of the North
Dakota Century Code. The patient's rights are limited by section 25-03.1-41 if the treating physician
or clinical psychologist feels such limitations are in the patient's best interest. The section further
provides that the treating physician or clinical psychologist rust give his reasoning for restricting the
patient's rights, bit the section does not provide for patient input into the procedure for restricting
the patient's rights. Id.
Section 25-03.1-41 of the North Dakota Century Code may also have the effect of allowing the
physician to prescribe unwanted or innecssary medication to a patient in non-emergency situations.
Section 25-03.1-24 of the North Dakota Centiry Code specifically permits the giving of medications
or other treatment to mentally ill patients in emergency situations. There is no specific definition of
emergency situation within the code. An emergency situiation, as implied by this section, colid be
defined as follows, "[tireatment. . . necessary to prevent bodily harm to the patient or others or to
prevent imminent deterioration of the respondent's physical or mental condition." N.D. CENT.
CooF. 25-03.1-24 (Sipp. 1979).
Section 25-03.1-41 allows the physician or clinical psychologist to interfere with patient's rights
(inchding the right to be free from unnecessary medication) on the basis of the treating professional's
jiudgment. Section 25-03.1-41 does not limit the physician or clinical psychologist to emergency
sititations as does section 25-03.1-24. N.D. CENT. CooF § 25-03.1-24 and § 25-03.1-41 (Spp. 1979).
63. See supra notes 16-22.
64. See supra note 60.

